Open Capital Account: Concrete Wealth or Paper Wealth by Junning Cai & Byron Gangnes
 
  - 1 -
 
Open Capital Account: Concrete Wealth or Paper Wealth
* 
 
Junning Cai and Byron Gangnes 
 
Abstract 
Empirical evidence shows that capital inflows are often used by developing countries 
to finance excessive consumption. The existing literature explains these phenomena 
as resulting from institutional imperfections. In contrast, we argue that they can be 
fundamental outcomes of open capital account, under which ineffectiveness in using 
foreign savings for investments tends to result in capital inflows being channeled to 
consumption through wealth effect. Our analysis shows that, while risk aversion 
causes low investment elasticity and hence reduces the total benefit of capital account 
liberalization for society over time, it nevertheless tends to increase the benefit 
enjoyed by current generations and hence drive consumption booms. We show that 
the proportion of capital inflows used for financing consumption is negatively 
correlated with investment elasticity. We show that a positive yet uncertain future 
productivity shock is likely to cause consumption booms because of sluggish 
investment reactions. Our analysis shows that, the greater the expected future 
productivity is; or the greater the uncertainty is; the stronger the consumption booms 
will be. (JEL F21 F32 F41 F43) 
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1.  Introduction 
One major motivation for developing countries to open capital account is to let free 
capital inflows facilitate domestic capital formation (Calvo et al. 1996). However, 
empirical evidence shows that unfettered (net) capital inflows are often used by 
developing country recipients to finance excessive consumption (Calvo et al., 1996; 
Ffrench-Davis and Reisen, 1998; Galvin et al., 1997)
1. We call such saving-crowd-out 
phenomena as “foreign-capital-financed” consumption booms, which are destabilizing in 
the short run and detrimental to national wealth accumulation in the long run. 
Particularly, foreign-capital-financed consumption booms tend to happen in countries 
undergoing macroeconomic reforms such as exchange-rate-based (ERB) stabilization 
programs (Montiel, 2000; Nazmi, 1997). 
In explaining foreign-capital-financed consumption booms, the existing literature 
focuses on how “institutional imperfections” in developing countries can trigger 
excessive consumption demands, which with the aid of free capital inflows will easily 
turn into consumption booms. One such imperfection is credit overexpansion (due to 
moral hazard) by underdeveloped and ill-regulated financial systems, which (by itself and 
through its impacts) tends to cause consumption booms (McKinnon and Pill, 1998; 
Reisen, 1998). Another imperfection is inconsistent or incredible government policies—
consumption booms can be the result of inconsistency between monetary (fiscal) policies 
and ERB (stabilization) programs (Helpman and Razin, 1987); besides, incredible (or 
perceived as temporary) ERB programs per se can cause consumption booms (Calvo, 
1986; Dornbush, 1985). Furthermore, ERB programs failing to stabilize inflation quick 
                                                 
1 Capital inflow recipients in this paper are small developing countries; and capital inflows are net inflows.   
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enough (due to of inertia in expectations) can also lead to consumption booms 
(Rodriguez, 1982).  
In summary, although open capital account certainly plays a role in financing 
consumption booms, the existing literature generally views consumption booms as a 
macroeconomic “side” effect of open capital account due to institutional imperfections.   
In contrast, this paper investigates a wealth effect mechanism by which consumption 
booms can be a fundamental outcome of open capital account.  
The essence of the mechanism is as follows. Open capital account tends to attract 
foreign capitals into developing countries for high-yielding opportunities. Such capital 
inflows can increase the stock of productive capital (K), its price (Tobin’s q), or most 
likely both. While the increase in K is the result of capital inflows being “properly” 
channeled to investments, the q appreciation tends to stimulate consumption demand 
(through wealth effect) and hence essentially channel capital inflows to consumption.  
A key yet underappreciated point is that the magnitude of q appreciation and hence 
the corresponding consumption booms are negatively correlated to the q-elasticity of 
investments. Thus, a conjecture is that, when investment “impediments” make it difficult 
to turn foreign savings into investments (as “concrete” wealth), “paper” wealth will 
nevertheless be created (through asset price appreciation) and result in foreign savings 
being channeled to consumption.  
The remainder of the paper attempts to examine this conjecture and its implications. 
Section 2 analyzes the influence of investment elasticity on the aftermath of capital 
account liberalization. Section 3 examines foreign-capital-financed consumption booms 
driven by productivity shocks. Section 4 concludes.   
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2.  Capital account liberalization: “concrete” vs. “paper” wealth creation  
For a developing country with domestic interest rates higher than the world interest rate, 
capital account liberalization tends to increase foreign demands on domestic assets, 
which can facilitate productive capital formation as “concrete” wealth. However, if 
investments are less than perfectly elastic, increases in asset demands will also result in 
”paper” wealth formation through asset price appreciation, which tends to enrich current 
consumers (as a whole) and thus encourage consumption.
2 In a word, that foreign savings 
are used to finance consumption can simply be the result of their not being effectively 




The modeling of consumption follows the finite-horizon model in Blanchard (1985). 
Each of many identical consumers throughout her lifetime faces a constant probability of 
death  π. At any instant of continuous time, a cohort with size π is born. Thus, the 
population size (∫ ∞ −
− − =
t s t ds e 1
) ( π π ) is constant (at unity) over time.  
In every period, a living consumer supplies one unit of labor inelastically and 





t v dv e v s c Max
) ( ) , ( log
π , 
                                                 
2 While increases in productive capital are “concrete” wealth because they imply more future incomes, 
asset price appreciation induced by increases in asset demands is “paper” wealth in the sense that it is a 
revaluation of the same amount of future earnings represented by assets. Nevertheless, such “paper” wealth 
does make current consumers as a whole wealthier—see Cai (2003) for detailed discussion.    
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where  ) , ( t s c  denotes the period-t consumption of a consumer born in period s—apply 
this (s, t) notation rule to other variables as well. Note that for simplicity we assume zero 
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where variables a, w, and r are, respectively, asset, wage, and the rate of return to asset 
(i.e., the interest rate). Note that the “effective” rate of return to asset is  π + r  because the 
consumer can use her asset as a stake to “bet” on her own death—see Blanchard (1985, 
p.226) for detail. 
The solution to the consumer’s maximizing problem gives  
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represents the consumer’s human wealth. 
Aggregating equation (1) gives the aggregate consumption function: 
) ( t t t H A C + =π    (2)  
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where variables C, H and A are the aggregate consumption, human wealth and non-
human wealth respectively; the dynamics of which are as follows:
3   
t t t t A C r C
2 π − = &  (3) 
t t t t W H r H − + = ) ( π &    (4) 
t t t t t C W A r A − + = &  (5) 
 
Production 
In every period, identical, profit-maximizing, and perfectly competitive firms hire capital 
and labor to produce consumption goods with the standard Cobb-Douglas technology. 
With inelastic unit labor supply, the aggregate production function is  
α λ t t t K K F Y = = ) ( , (6) 
where variables K and Y are capital stock and output respectively; parameters l and a are  
respectively technical coefficient and capital share. Profit maximization under perfect 
competition makes firms pay factors by their marginal products: 
) ( ' t t K F R = ,   (7) 
) ( ' ) ( t t t K KF K F W − = , (8) 
where Rt and Wt are income per unit of capital and labor respectively. 
                                                 
3 The aggregate counterpart of a variable x (s, t) is given by ds pe t s x t X
t s p
t
) ( ) , ( ) (
−
∞ −∫ = ; see Blanchard 
(1985, pp.228-229) for detail.  
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Investment 
A variety of investment impediments can make investments less than perfectly elastic: 
e.g., investment adjustment costs, risk-averse entrepreneurs, investment uncertainty and 
irreversibility—to name a few fundamental ones; let alone those caused by institutional 
imperfections.  
Considering the (arguable) lack of entrepreneur spirit in developing countries, we in 
the following model risk-averse investing behaviors as one example of investment 
impediments; whereas investment adjustment costs will give the same results
4—we will 
look into the case of uncertainty and irreversibility in the next section.  
In every period, identical entrepreneurs engage in investing activities that transform 
consumption goods into new capital.
5 Individual entrepreneur j chooses the amount of 
investment (
j




t EU Max Π  
where ) ( t t t t I c I q − = Π  represents investment profits— ) (I c  is the investment cost 
(function) in terms of consumption.  
Investments are risky with a stochastic cost function:  






t z I I c + = , (9) 
where ) , 0 ( ~
2 σ N zt  is a normally distributed random variable. Entrepreneurs are risk- 
averse with utility function:  
                                                 
4 See Cai (2003) for a case of investment adjustment costs as an investment impediment. 
5 To clearly examine investment behaviors, we model the production and investment decision makings 
separately—see Abel (2003) for a similar framework. 
6 The utility rather than profit maximization is for the purpose of modeling risk-averse investment 
behaviors; otherwise, utility and profit maximizations are equivalent  
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Π − − = Π
ϕ e U ) ( , (10) 
where parameter j measures (constant) absolute risk aversion.  
According to equations (9) and (10), entrepreneur j’s maximizing problem becomes  
∫
− − − Π − − = Π Π − = Π
] 2 / ) 1 [(
2 2
) ( ) (
















e d f e U E Max , 
the solution to which gives individual investment function: 
j
t t I q
2 1 ϕσ + = . Then, the 
aggregate investment function (with n identical entrepreneurs) would be 
t t I q η + =1 , (11) 
where coefficient  n /
2 ϕσ η =  is negatively related to the q-elasticity of investments 
(“investment elasticity” in short); and 
j
t t nI I =  represents the aggregate investment.  
Equation (11) implies that under risky investments (σ  > 0) and risk-averse 
entrepreneurs (ϕ > 0), the aggregate investment is less than perfectly elastic; and the 
elasticity is negatively correlated with the riskiness of investments or the risk aversion of 
entrepreneurs.  
Given a large number of entrepreneurs ( 0 >> n ) and according to the law of large 












t t I nI z n I I c I c = = + = = ∑ ∑
=1
) ( ) ( ) ( , (12) 
which implies constant marginal cost of investment in aggregate. Note that the less-than-
perfectly-elastic aggregate investment notwithstanding constant aggregate marginal 
investment cost is because of increasing marginal risk premia demanded by risk-averse 
entrepreneurs. 
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The Close Economy 
In autarky, the perishable consumption goods is either consumed or invested; thus the 
goods market equilibrium condition implies  
t t t I C Y + =        (13) 
Capital is the only store of value; thus the aggregate non-human wealth is equal to the 
value of the capital stock 
t t t K q A =  (14) 








+ ) ( ' 1  (15) 
For simplicity, assume zero depreciation in capital; thus, 
t t I K = &  (16) 
The dynamics of the close economy is described by the simultaneous system composed 
of equations (2), (4), (6), (8), and (11)-(16) with endogenous  A, H, K (as stock variables), 
Y, W, C, I, (as flow variables), plus r and q (as prices). A little inspection reveals the 
steady-state values (denoted with asterisks) of several key variables: 
2 / 1 * πα = r , 1
* = q , 
1 1 ) 1 ( 2 / 1 ) 1 ( * ) (
− − − − − − =
α α α πα λ C ,  and 
1 1 ) 1 ( 2 / 1 ) 1 ( * ) (
− − − − − − =
α α πα λ K .  
 
The Open Economy 
With open capital account, the interest rate is exogenously determined by the world 
interest rate. For comparison, assume the world interest rate is equal to the steady-state 
interest rate (r* ) of the close economy, under which the close and open economies 
converge to the same steady state, but tend to have different convergent paths.   
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In the open economy, the goods market equilibrium condition becomes  
t t t t TB I C Y + + = , (17) 
where TBt represents trade balance. With open capital account, the non-human wealth 
becomes 
t t t t B K q A + = , (18) 
where B represents net foreign asset; the dynamics of which, i.e., the current account 
(CA) dynamics, is characterized by 
t t t t B r TB B CA
* + = = & . (19) 
The other aspects of the open economy are the same as those in the close economy.  
In summary, the dynamics of the open economy can be described by the simultaneous 
system composed of equations (2), (4), (6), (8), (11), (12), and (15)-(19) with endogenous 
A, H, K, B (as stock variables), Y, W, C, I, TB (as flow variables), and q (as price). It is 
not difficult to verify that the steady state of the open economy is identical to that of the 
close economy. 
 
Post-liberalization scenario comparison under different investment elasticity.  
Intuitively, countries with high investment elasticity, ceteris paribus, will have high post-
liberalization investments and hence high gross national products (GNP = Y + r*B); thus 
they should accordingly enjoy high post-liberalization consumption. However, we will 
show that countries with low post-liberalization GNP over time (due to low investment 
elasticity) can nonetheless have high post-liberalization consumption for some time.  
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The post-liberalization dynamics of an economy (opening up at time t =0 with 
*
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1 * − − − + =
−
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− − − + = η λ α α
α K r m  and 
2 *) ( ) 1 (
− − =
α λ α α K n . The solution to which 
gives the growth paths of C, B, K and q:  
* * ) ( *
0 ] ) ( ) 1 )[( (
*
C e r e K K C
t t r
t + − + + − =
− ε π ε β π β  (25) 
] )[ 1 )( (
) ( *
0
* t t r
t e e K K B
ε π β − + − =
−  (26) 
* *
0 ) ( K e K K K
t
t + − =
ε  (27) 
1 ) (
*
0 + − =
t
t e K K q
ε εη  (28) 
where 0 ) 4 / ( 2 /
2 / 1 1 2 < + − =
− η ε n m m  and 
1 * 1 * * 2 ) ( ) (
− − − + + − = r r K ε π ε π εη π β .
8 
Equations (25)-(28) describe the post-liberalization dynamics of several key 
variables; based on which comparative statics can be used to illustrate the impacts of η 
                                                 
7 Equation (20) is derived from equations (3) and (18); equation (21) from equations (6), (11), (17) and 
(19); equation (22) from (11) and (16); and equation (23) from (11), (15) and (16). 
8 See Mathematical Appendix for detail.    
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(or essentially investment elasticity) on each variable. However, due to mathematical 
complications, the signs of some comparative statics are hard to be determined 
analytically. Thus, we choose to use numerical simulations to compare post-liberalization 
scenarios under different η.  
The parameters in the simulation model composed of equations (25)-(28) are set as: 
3 / 1 = α  (as usual);  60 / 1 = π  (i.e., the average life expectancy is 60); and  60 / 3 = λ  
(for normalizing the steady-state capital stock to unity, i.e.,  1
* = K ). Initial capital stock 
is set as  9 . 0 0 = K . Results based on this setting are qualitatively robust for other 
parameter settings.  
Based on this simulation model, we first compare post-liberalization GNP under 
different η. For easy visualization, Figure 1 (a) compares GNP under  60 , 40 , 20 , 10 = η  
respectively; whereas Figure 1 (b) provides more complete GNP comparison for 
] 600 , 0 [ ∈ η . Figure 1 indicates the following result.  
 
Remark 2.1  Ceteris paribus, high η (i.e. low investment elasticity) tends to result in 
permanent low post-liberalization GNP.  
 
This result is not surprising and can be explained as follows. Note that part of the capital 
stock of a country with negative net foreign asset is essentially owned by foreign 
residences. Suppose the total and domestic-owned capital stock are K  and  d K  
respectively; then 
α α λ α αλ K K K w K r d d ) 1 ( GNP
1 − + = + =
− . It is not difficult to verify 
that, given  K Kd < ,  0 GNP/ > ∂ ∂ K , which implies that, given domestic-owned capital  
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stock ( d K ), the lower the total capital stock (K ) is, the smaller the GNP will be.   
Therefore, given the initial capital stock, the smaller the (post-liberalization) investments 
are, the smaller the GNP will be. As h negatively affects post-liberalization investments, 
high h will lead to low post-liberalization GNP over time.  
While the impact of η on post-liberalization GNP is as expected, that on 
consumption is puzzling. As shown in Figure 2, the impact of η on post-liberalization 
consumption can be summarized as follows.  
 
Remark 2.2  Ceteris paribus, high η (i.e. low investment elasticity) tends to result in 
high consumption for some time immediately after the liberalization; notwithstanding the 
effect of η on (future) consumption will eventually become negative in the long run.    
 
Base on the aggregate consumption function represented by equation (2), this result is not 
difficult to explain mathematically. Although high η tends to result in low post-
liberalization capital stock, hence low labor income, and hence low human wealth (H), it 
also tends to cause high capital price (Figure 3) and hence high non-human wealth (A). 
For some time after the liberalization, the latter effect tends to outweigh the former; thus 
the total wealth (A+H) will be positively affected by η. Then, according to equation (2), 
so will be the aggregate consumption. As η has a negative impact on A+H in the long 
run, the impact of η on future consumption will eventually become negative. 
However, a puzzling issue is how to reconcile Remarks 2.1 and 2.2, which together 
imply that, given the constant (world) interest rate, an economy with low GNP in the 
entire post-liberalization period can nonetheless have high consumption for some time.  
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More fundamentally, given the interest rate, how can permanently low GNP be consistent 
with large total wealth, which is supposed to embody the total (present) value of GNP 
over time?   
The key to this puzzle is that the total wealth of current consumers does not include 
future labor incomes beyond their (finite) horizons; in another word, the total wealth 
A+H does not embody the entire GNP over time.
9 Thus, while high h makes society as a 
whole worse off by lowering post-liberalization GNP over time, it can nevertheless make 
current consumers as a whole better off by increasing their wealth A+H. We explain this 
point in detail in the following. 
Ceteris paribus, low capital stock will result in low labor income (Wt) but high (per 
unit) capital income (Rt). Since the positive effect of capital stock on Wt tends to 
dominate its negative effect on Rt, the net effect of low post-liberalization capital stock 
over time (due to high η) will be low GNP over time. However, a key point is that, while 
the gains from high Rt (over time) are completely reaped by current consumers through q 
appreciation,
10 the losses from low Wt will be mostly burdened by future unborn 
consumers. Therefore, current consumers (as a whole) can nevertheless be better off from 
high h (i.e. low investment elasticity), even though the total benefit for the society as a 
whole is lowered. In a sense, current consumers can benefit from the failure of capital 
account liberalization in accomplishing its presupposed mission. 
 
                                                 
9 In Blanchard’s (1985) framework adopted here, finite horizon is modeled as a constant probability (p) of 
death. Thus, while an infinite-living outlier individual is theoretically possible, current consumers as a 
whole is expected to have a horizon equal to the mean life expectancy (i.e., 1/p). The implication of this 
finite-horizon feature on human wealth is mathematically captured by a higher discount rate (i.e., r+p) for 
labor income. 
10 Whatever Rt is, the rate of return to future asset ownerships will be fixed at the world interest rate.    
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Remark 2.3  Low investment elasticity (i.e. high h) tends to result in low post-
liberalization GNP over time and hence reduce the total benefit (for society as a whole) 
of capital account liberalization. However, low investment elasticity can nonetheless 
increase the wealth of current generations and hence lead to high consumption for some 
time immediately after the liberalization.   
 
Figure 2 (a) indicates that the high-consumption era lasts for around 60 periods, i.e., the 
mean lifespan of a generation.  
The (transitory) negative relationship between investment elasticity and post-
liberalization consumption suggests that post-liberalization consumption booms can 
result from low investment elasticity. To confirm, we need to compare between post-
liberalization and autarky scenarios.   
 
Investment elasticity and post-liberalization consumption booms 
Suppose an autarky economy opens at t = 0 with 
*
0 K K <  and  0 0 = B , foreign capitals 
will flow in; the amount of which can be measured by current account (CA) deficits.  Part 
of the capital inflows will be used to financed extra investments 
a o I I I 0 0 0 − = ∆ —note that 
o I  and 
a I  represent the open and autarky aggregate investments respectively—and the 
rest will essentially be used for extra consumption.  
The proportion of CA used to finance consumption can be measured by 
) /( 1 0 0 CA I − ∆ − = ρ , (29) 
which can be taken as an indicator of the extent of post-liberalization consumption 
booms.   
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A comparison between 
o I0  and  
a I0   is necessary to reveal ρ . Unfortunately, while 
o I  (and CA as well) can be solved from equations (25)-(28), the analytical solution to 
a I  
is hard to obtain, because the autarky interest rate is endogenous. 
To provide some basic insights as to the impact of investment elasticity on ρ , we 
choose to conduct autarky-open comparison in a tractable model designed to approximate 
the rational-expectation (RE) model presented above.  
In the “proxy” model, we assume aggregate consumption function as  
) ( t t t H A C + =π    (2') 
where  t t W r H
1 * ) (





t dv e t W H
v
t
] ) ( [
) (
π
 in the RE aggregate 
consumption function represented by equation (2). The difference between  t H  and  t H  is 
that, while  t H  implies that consumers have perfect foresights over future wage incomes 
and interest rates,  t H  implies that, in calculating human wealth, consumers use the 
current wage income and steady-state interest rate to approximate future wage incomes 
and interest rates respectively. With equation (2) replaced by (2'), the proxy model is 
tractable for both open and autarky scenarios, and hence allows us to conduct the 
autarky-open comparison.  
In the proxy model, the autarky economy will have the same steady state as the RE 
model; yet the dynamics may be different. On the one hand, by using the current wage (as 
a proxy for increasing wage incomes over time) to calculate human wealth, the proxy 
model tends to “underestimate” the autarky consumption 
a C0  (relative to the RE 
consumption as a benchmark). On the other hand, by using the steady-state interest rate  
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r* as a proxy for the autarky decreasing interest rates over time, the proxy model tends to 
“inflate” human wealth and hence “overestimate” 
a C0 .  If the balance of these two 
opposite effects is neutral, the proxy model provides a good approximation of 
a C0  in the 
RE model.  Unfortunately, the state of the balance is unclear. However, while the 
underestimation problem also happens to the post-liberalization consumption 
o C0 , the 
overestimation problem will not, because the open-economy interest rate over time is 
indeed r*. Thus, the proxy model would in general have larger overestimation (or smaller 
underestimation) on 
a C0  than 
o C0 , which,  in light of the fact that 
a o C C 0 0 > , implies an 
underestimation of 
a o C C 0 0 − .  
In sum, relative to the RE model, the proxy model tends to underestimate the open-
autarky consumption difference and hence the severity of post-liberalization consumption 
booms. Technically, as (will be shown in a moment) we find a positive impact of h on ρ  
in the proxy model, we expect the impact will be stronger in the RE model. 
In the proxy model, the autarky (aggregate) investment, the post-liberalization 
investment, and the (post-liberalization) current account can be solved analytically.
11 The 
results are  
t a
t e K K I
ω ω ) (
*
0 − = ,   (30) 
t o
t e K K I
ε ε ) (
*
0 − = ,   (31) 
and  
] ) )[( (
~ ) ( * *
0
* t t r
t e e r K K CA
ε π ε π β − − − =
− ,   (32) 
                                                 
11 See Mathematics Appendix (A.2) for detail  
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where  [ ] 0 ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 (
2 * * * < + Ψ − + − Ψ =
− K K r πη λ πη α π ω
α  and  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1
1 2 / 1 α α − + − = Ψ
− ; 
[]
1 * * 1 * * ) ( ) )( 1 ( 1
~ − − − − + + − − = π ε εηπ π α π β r K r r   
According to equation (30), the investment would be  ) (
*
0 0 K K I
a − =ω  if the 
economy stays autarky at time t = 0. Yet, if it chooses to open up, equations (31) and (32) 
indicate that the investment would be  ) (
*
0 0 K K I
o − = ε ; and the current account be 
) )( (
~ * *
0 0 ε π β − − − = r K K CA . Substituting these results into equation (29) will give 
1 * 1 ) (
~
) ( 1
− − − − − + = ε π β ω ε ρ r , which measures the extent of post-liberalization 
consumption boom.  
Since mathematical complexity prevents us from determining the sign of  η ρ d d /  
analytically, we choose to illustrate the impact of h on r through numerical simulations. 
The result of numerical simulations based on the parameters setting used above (i.e. 
3 / 1 = α ; 60 / 1 = π ; and  60 / 3 = λ ) is illustrated in Figure 4, which indicates a positive 
relationship between ρ  and h. It should be noted that the positive relationship is 
qualitatively robust for other parameter settings we have tried.  
Therefore, we have the following remark.  
 
Remark 2.4  The higher the h (or the lower the investment elasticity) is, the greater the 
proportion of post-liberalization capital inflows will be used for financing consumption 
booms.  
 
In a word, post-liberalization consumption booms can simply be the results of 
sluggishness in transforming foreign savings into domestic investments.   
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3.  Productivity shock, uncertainty, and consumption booms 
One insight provided by the literature on investment uncertainty and irreversibility is that, 
uncertain yet profitable investment opportunities can nevertheless remain unexploited 
even when markets are efficient and entrepreneurs are risk neutral (Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994). This is because “wait-and-see” can be a better strategy when the cost of waiting 
(i.e., profits unearned) is smaller than that of being stuck with underperformed yet 
irreversible investments.  
Therefore, similar to entrepreneurs’ risk aversion, uncertainty and irreversibility 
together (as two common features of investments) can be another “investment 
impediment” responsible for foreign-capital-financed consumption booms. 
Consider an open developing economy under structural reforms that are expected to 
increase future productivities. With easy access to low-cost foreign funds, high future 
productivities imply profitable investment opportunities. However, these opportunities 
may not be taken by entrepreneurs who prefer to postpone investment decisions till the 
outcomes of the reforms become more certain. If so, the influence of the (expected) high 
future productivity will be on asset price (appreciation), which tends to trigger 
consumption booms. Based on a simplified and discrete version of the model presented 
above, we examine this conjecture in the following.  
 
Backdrop 
At the beginning of period t = 0, a small open economy initiates a reform that will take 
one period to accomplish. If successful, the reform will lead to higher (than current) 
productivity from period t = 1 onward; whereas a failure will result in lower productivity.  
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Notwithstanding uncertain, the reform is promising; i.e., the expected future productivity 
is higher. 
Against this backdrop, we are interested in the impacts of the reform on current 
economic activities including investments, asset price movements, and consumption.  
 
Productivity and capital income 
At the beginning of period t = 0, the period-zero productivity is known as  0 λ . Yet, future 
productivities are uncertain as follows:  






− = = >
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p z z z




1 ) ( Pr : 0
) ( Pr : 0
. 
According to equation (33), the economic future (i.e., period one onward) can be 
either of a “miracle” or a “debacle” (with probability  0 > p )—
m z  and 
d z  are the miracle 
and debacle productivity shocks respectively. Despite uncertain, the future is promising, 
with expected future productivity higher than  0 λ ; i.e.,  0 ) 1 ( ) ( > − + = ≡
m d z p pz z E z . 
The uncertainty is temporary—at the end of period zero, the nature of productivity 
shock (
m z  or 
d z ) is determined and observable.  
Let R0, R
m, and R
d denote period-zero, “miracle” future, and “debacle” future income 
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t , which give 
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+ = , (34) 
and  
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0
0






+ = .   (35) 
 
Investment 
Investments are of “putty-clay” nature. That is, one unit of consumption good can 
produce one unit of capital; yet, capital is irreversible.  
With open capital account, the cost of fund is equal to the world interest rate (r*). 





























invest ,   (36)   
with the first and second terms on the right hand side (RHS) representing the present 
values of period-zero and expected future profits respectively.  
Entrepreneurs can choose not to invest at the beginning of period zero, but to 
postpone investment decisions till the end of it when R
m or R
d is observable. No 
investment at the beginning of period zero means zero profit during which. If the future 
turns out to be a debacle at the end of period zero, entrepreneurs will not invest, because 
the debacle capital income is less that the cost of capital (i.e., 
* r R
d < ).
12 If the future is a 
miracle, entrepreneurs will invest. Since the probability of the miracle future is 1ø p, the 














= Π    (37) 
 
                                                 
12 We ignore trivial equilibria where 
* r R
d > .    
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Equilibrium 
Investment 
Risk-neutral and profit-maximizing entrepreneurs will keep investing as long as 
0 ≥ Π
invest E  and 
wait invest E E Π > Π . Therefore, one necessary condition for equilibrium 
is
13   
wait invest E E Π = Π , 











+ = . (38)     





















r R . (39) 
Thus, according to equations (7) and (39), the equilibrium period-zero capital stock 































R K , (40) 
which implies  0 / 0 < ∂ ∂ p K
e  and  0 / 0 > ∂ ∂
d e z K . Thus, 
 
Remark 3.1  The higher the debacle probability (or the lower the debacle productivity) 
is, the lower the current investments will be. 
 
                                                 
13 We ignore trivial equilibria where
wait invest E E Π < Π .  
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Intuitively, the probability and severity of the future debacle are two “impediment” 
elements that keep entrepreneurs from taking profitable investment opportunities 
immediately.  
Given p and z
d, equation (40) implies  0 / 0 = ∂ ∂ z K
e . Thus, 
 
Remark 3.2  The expected future productivity (per se) has no influence over current 
investments. 
 
This so-called “bad-news” (or “irrelevant-good-news”) principle (Bernanke, 1983) is 
because the wait-and-see strategy will not cost entrepreneurs the opportunity to invest in 
the miracle future.   
 
Capital Price 
The price of irreversible capital is determined by the present value of expected future 




















































which implies that, if  0 > p , 1 0 >
e q .
14 Put plainly, 
 
                                                 
14 Without uncertainty (i.e., p = 0), 
e q0  will be equal to one, but not 
1 * 1
0 ) 1 ( 1
− − + + r zλ  implied by 
equation (41). This is because, without uncertainty, firms will be active in investments; hence competitive 
market force will make equilibrium achieved only at  1 0 =
e q .  
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Remark 3.3  Uncertainty over future productivities tends to result in (expected) 
profitable investment opportunities unexploited in equilibrium, even though markets are 
efficient; and entrepreneurs are risk-neutral. 
 
This “inefficient” outcome is not the result of any market failure. Positive profits (in 
equilibrium) are necessary to compensate expected losses from being stuck with debacle 
investments.   
Equation (41) implies that  0 / 0 > ∂ ∂ z q
e . Thus, 
 
Remark 3.4  The greater the expected future productivity is, the higher the current 
equilibrium capital price will be.  
 
As (high) future productivity has no influence over capital formation (Remark 3.2), its 
impact will be on asset price (appreciation).   
Equation (41) implies that, given z , 0 / 0 > ∂ ∂ p q
e  and  0 / 0 < ∂ ∂
d e z q . Thus, 
 
Remark 3.5  Given expected future productivity, the higher the debacle probability (or 
the lower the debacle productivity) is, the higher the capital price will be. 
 
Intuitively, high debacle probability (or low debacle productivity) makes it more costly to 
be stuck in the debacle future; thus, high asset prices (i.e., high investment profits) are 
necessary for entrepreneurs to invest.   
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Consumption 
Given the inherited aggregate human-wealth  1 − K  (at the beginning of period zero), and 
according to equation (2), the equilibrium aggregate consumption would be 
) ( 0 1 0 0
e e e H K q C + = − π ,   (42) 
where  
H r K F H
e e + + − =
−1
0 0 ) * )( ( ) 1 ( π α ,   (43) 
in which the first term on the RHS represents the period-zero labor income; and H is 
equal to the present value of expected labor incomes from period one onward, which 
depend on the expected future productivity:   0 / > ∂ ∂ z H . 
According to equation (43), that  0 / 0 = ∂ ∂ z K
e  and  0 / > ∂ ∂ z H  imply  0 / 0 > ∂ ∂ z H
e . 
According to equation (42), that  0 / 0 > ∂ ∂ z q
e ,  0 / 1 = ∂ ∂ − z K  and  0 / 0 > ∂ ∂ z H
e  imply 
0 / 0 > ∂ ∂ z C
e . Note that the positive effect of future productivity (z ) on consumption 
(
e C0 ) includes both human and non-human wealth effect.  
The impact of p on 
e C0  is two folded:  That  0 / 0 > ∂ ∂ p q
e  implies a positive p-effect on 
e C0  through non-human wealth; whereas  0 / 0 < ∂ ∂ p K
e  implies a negative p-effect on 
e C0  
through human wealth 
e H0 . An analytical determination of the balance of the two effects 
is intractable in this simple model here. However, considering the fact that (given z ) 
0 / = ∂ ∂ p H ,  p will only influence the period-zero labor income but not beyond, the 
human wealth effect tends to be dominated by the non-human wealth effect—this 
conjecture is supported by simulations in the last section. Therefore, the case of 
0 / 0 > ∂ ∂ p C
e  is more likely; and following the same logic, so is  0 / 0 < ∂ ∂
d e z C .   
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The results  0 / 0 > ∂ ∂ z C
e , 0 / 0 > ∂ ∂ p C
e , and  0 / 0 < ∂ ∂
d e z C  provide the following 
insights: 
 
Remark 3.6  The greater the expected future productivity is; or the greater the debacle 
probability is; or the greater the severity of the debacle is, the higher the current 
consumption will be.  
 
Without uncertainty, the major impact of (high) expected future productivity will be on 
(high) investments; and capital price will be anchored by the marginal cost of 
investments (assumed constant at unity here). Consumption will increase because of the 
positive human wealth effect; yet, consumption booms driven by asset price appreciation 
will not happen.   
With uncertainty (plus irreversibility), high expected future productivity will have 
little influence over current investments because of the “wait-and-see” atmosphere. Then 
its impact will be on asset price appreciation, which can trigger consumption booms.  
Given expected future productivity, the magnitude of current asset price appreciation 
is also related to the chance and severity of future debacles. A high debacle probability 
(or a low debacle productivity) will result in low investments and hence strong asset price 
appreciation, which tends to increase the magnitude of consumption booms.   
 
4.  Concluding Remarks 
The main message this paper attempts to convey is that, when developing countries have 
difficulty in turning foreign savings into domestic investments, they tend to use them for  
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consumption. Our analysis confirms this conjecture in the cases of capital account 
liberalization and productivity increase as two driving forces of capital inflows.  
In general, when capital inflows, driven by any force,
15 cannot be sufficiently 
absorbed into physical capital formation due to less than perfectly elastic investments, 
they tend to result in asset price appreciation. Through wealth effect, the appreciation 
tends to drive consumption booms (financed by foreign capital). In the sense that 
investments in reality can seldom be perfectly elastic even with perfect institutions, we 
claim that consumption booms tend to be fundamental outcomes of open capital account. 
In another word, institutional improvements may not be sufficient to prevent capital 
inflows from being channeled to consumption. 
One may argue that, notwithstanding financed by capital inflows, consumption booms 
without institutional imperfections are not excessive but normal outcomes of efficient 
market mechanisms. In particular, post-liberalization high consumption can be viewed as 
welfare-improving consumption intertemporal allocation by an eternal representative 
agent (or dynasty) facing the low world interest rate.  
However, the welfare implications from a finite-horizon perspective are more 
complicated. On the one hand, a ceteris paribus interest rate fall tends to benefit current 
non-human-wealth owners (through asset price appreciation) at the cost of current and 
future human-wealth owners (through a lowered rate of return to savings). On the other 
hand, high investments induced by the interest rate fall can lead to high labor incomes, 
which (if sufficiently high) can compensate (or outweigh) human-wealth owners’ losses. 
Therefore, the welfare implications of capital account liberalization to human wealth 
                                                 
15 Under open capital account, a variety of domestic “pull” factors (such as favorable productivity shocks or 
reduction in country risk premium etc.) or foreign “push” factors (such as a fall in the world interest rate) 
can drive capital inflows.  
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owners depend on its effect on capital formation. When low investment elasticity makes 
the gains from high labor incomes dominated by the losses from low interest rate, human-
wealth owners will be worse off from capital account liberalization. Therefore, post-
liberalization consumption booms enjoyed by current consumers can be at the cost of low 
consumption suffered by future generations.  
A somewhat surprising insight is that, while low post-liberalization investments (due 
to low investment elasticity) reduce the total benefit of capital account liberalization for 
society as a whole, they nonetheless tend to make current consumers as a whole better off 
through “paper” wealth created by asset price appreciation. Such wealth is not bubbles 
driven by speculation or credit overexpansion, but rather a result of asset revaluation 
under lower interest rates. Notwithstanding commonly viewed as “real” wealth, we call it 
“paper” wealth to emphasize the fact that it can be destroyed as easily as it is created. 
During the 1997 Asian financial crises, Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia 
at that time, complained that it took speculators only two weeks to destroy the wealth 
painstakingly accumulated by Malaysian people over decades. Wealth that can easily 
“evaporate” without physical resources being destroyed, notwithstanding “real”, may not 
be concrete enough. In this sense, a concrete-paper wealth tradeoff leaned to the “paper” 
side may not be really in the interest of current consumers.   
Besides, foreign-capital-financed consumption booms can be the root of low savings, 
high current account deficits, and real exchange rate appreciation (if non-tradable goods 
taken into consideration), which combined tend to be a recipe for crises.  
If taken as undesirable, what can be done to prevent foreign-capital-finance 
consumption booms? To increase investment elasticity through reducing investment  
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impediments (such as nurturing entrepreneur spirit or reducing uncertainties) will 
certainly help, but may not be easy or practical. Investment subsidies can be used to 
stimulate investments directly, but may not be practical and can have little influence on 
temporary investment sluggishness caused by “wait-and-see” strategies. Consumption 
credit controls can restrain consumption financed by borrowing but not those by asset 
holdings. Capital controls can avoid paper wealth creation by aligning the domestic 
interest rate level with the earning level of domestic assets; yet, its enforceability and 
“collateral damages” need to be taken into consideration.  
All in all, sensible policy prescriptions for addressing foreign-capital-financed 
consumption booms tend to be case sensitive and belong to the scope of empirical 
studies. The main contribution of this paper is to provide a diagnosis underappreciated by 
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Mathematic Appendix (A.1-A.2) 
A.1 
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Assume  4 3 ε ε ≠ . Then, with two negative eigenvalues and two initial conditions 
0 ) 0 ( K K =  and  0 ) 0 ( = B , there exists a unique convergent path to the steady state. To 
solve for the path, we need the eigenvectors of  3 ε  and  4 ε , which are respectively 
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where 
1 * 1 * * 2 ) ( ) (
− − − + + − = r r K ε π ε π εη π β . Thus, the solution to equation (24) is  
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Given initial conditions  0 ) 0 ( K K =  and  0 ) 0 ( = B , according to the second and third 
equations in the simultaneous system (A.1), we have  ) 1 ( 0 2 1 β + − = u u  and 
*
0 2 K K u − = . Thus,   ) )( 1 (
*
0 1 K K u − + = β . Substitute u1 and u2 back to (A.1) gives the 
solution to (24). 
 
A.2 
The Proxy Model (autarky) 
The modified aggregate consumption function can be written as 
α λ α α π t t t K K q t C ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) (
1 2 / 1 − + + =
−  (A.2) 
Equations (11) and (16) imply 
t t K q & 2 1 ϕσ + =       (A.3) 
Substituting equations (A.2), (A.3), and (6) into equation (13) gives 
() ()
1 1
− + − Ψ = t t t t K K K K πη π λ
α & ,    (A.4) 
where ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1
1 2 / 1 α α − + − = Ψ
− . Linearizing equation (A.4) around steady state gives 
) (
* K K K t t − =ω & ,   (A.5) 
where  [ ] 0 ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 (
2 * * * < + Ψ − + − Ψ =
− K K r πη λ πη α π ω
α . Thus, according to (A.5) and 
the initial condition  0 ) 0 ( K K = , we have 
t




* − + = , based on which we 
have equation (30), i.e., 
t a
t e K K I
ω ω ) (
*
0 − = . 
 
A.3 
The Proxy Model (open economy)   
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In the open-economy model, using the modified consumption function to substitute for C 
will give the following dynamic system: 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) (
1 1 * * − − − + − − − + =
− −
t t t t t t t t q K r B K q K B r B η λ α π π π π λ




t t q K η & , 
) ( ) 1 (
* K K n q m q t t t − + − = & , 




























































* 1 * * ) 1 ( ) ( r r r α π π π − + − − = ∆
− . Given initial conditions  0 ) 0 ( K K =  and 
0 ) 0 ( = B , the solution to (A.6) is  
) )( (
~ ) ( *
0
* t t r
t e e K K B
ε π β − − =
−  
* *
0 ) ( K e K K K
t




0 + − =
t
t e K K q
ε εη  
where 
2 / 1 2 ) / 4 / ( 2 / η ε n m m + − =  and  [ ]
1 * * 1 * * ) ( ) )( 1 ( 1
~ − − − − + + − − = π ε εηπ π α π β r K r r .  
Given initial conditions  0 ) 0 ( K K =  and  0 ) 0 ( = B , we can have equations (31) and (32), 
respectively, 
t o
t e K K I
ε ε ) (
*
0 − =  and  ] ) )[( (
~ ) ( * *
0
* t t r
t t e e r K K B CA
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